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Abstract
This paper investigates the theoretical impact of including two empirically-grounded innovations in a lifecycle portfolio choice model. The rst innovation is a portfolio adjustment cost
which employees face when managing their nancial wealth rather than delegating the task
to a professional money manager. When job-specic human capital is accumulated through
learning-by-doing, investing time in nancial management imposes opportunity costs in terms
of current and future human capital accumulation. The second innovation is the incorporation of
age-dependent eciency patterns in nancial decision making. These two innovations replicate
observed inactivity in portfolio adjustment patterns, especially for younger and older employees.
This framework also allows an analysis of the choice between managing one's own money and
delegating the task to a nancial advisor. The calibrated model quanties welfare gains that
the delegation option can bring to the lifecycle setting.

1 Introduction
Managing one's money can be a daunting task for people who are not deeply involved with nancial
markets day in and day out, or who suer from nancial illiteracy [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)].
The fact that dened contribution pensions have become so widespread exacerbates this problem,
since employees are increasingly required to manage their own retirement accruals. The reality is
∗
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that many individuals appear to do a very poor job of managing their own nances [c.f.

Tang,

Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2010)], indicating a probable need for professional advisors.
The goal of this paper is to develop a lifecycle model to evaluate the role of nancial advisors
in helping employees to manage their nancial portfolios. I incorporate human capital accumulation
and ineciency evidence from the nance literature in a standard lifecycle model. The rst innovation is to allow for portfolio adjustment costs which many people must bear when managing their
own nancial wealth.

This has a particular impact if the employee must accumulate job-specic

human capital through learning by doing; in this instance, spending time on one's own nancial
management imposes an opportunity cost in terms of current and future job-related human capital
accumulation. I also model an age-related time eciency pattern for nancial decision making, in
keeping with observed empirical evidence. These two factors are likely to make it costly for individuals to manage their own portfolios in ways that are consistent with observed low levels of trading
in workers' 401(k) accounts [Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Mitchell et al. (2006)].
I examine the role of nancial advisors in terms of time cost minimizers.

Previous eorts

in household nance have focused on optimal portfolio allocation patterns for a rational forwardlooking consumer who must decide on his own how to allocate his accruals between stocks and
bonds [c.f. Cocco et al. (2005); Horne et al. (2009)]. However, investors can also delegate portfolio
management to nancial advisors, which may be a more appealing option when there are high
costs for managing their nances.

In this regard, the need for a study on nancial advisors in

household nance has been highlighted [Campbell (2006)]. I incorporate nancial advisors as one
of the possible portfolio management schemes that investors can choose.

When investors choose

the delegation option, they can update their portfolios without sacricing time, but do pay some
portion of their wealth to nancial advisors in management fees.
In this model, introducing a forgone opportunity to accumulate human capital generates a
U-shaped and left-skewed pattern of portfolio inertia over ages when no delegation option exists.
Young investors are most inactive and middle-aged investors are most active in managing their
own money. Since young employees have a low level of human capital accumulation and also have
the longest usage horizon, their cost for nancial adjustment will be higher than that of middleaged employees who have accumulated a more signicant level of human capital. A dierent level of
portfolio adjustment cost across all age groups results in a dierent pattern of portfolio management
across age groups. The introduction of a delegation option has a signicant impact on all age groups
replacing the portfolio inertia, but there is still a divergent pattern of portfolio management across
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ages.
This paper is related to the literature of portfolio allocation with exible labor supply [Bodie
et al. (1992); Gomes and Michaelides (2003); Gomes et al. (2008); Chai et al. (2009); Horne
et al. (2009)]. The model uses a discrete dynamic choice technique as in Adda and Cooper (2000)
and Bonaparte and Cooper (2009).

We draw the pattern of cost for nancial decision making

from previous empirical ndings that individual nancial deciency is a sizable component in the
households' nancial management [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009)].
The main contribution of this paper is to solve a lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply
and portfolio choice with a nancial management cost, which allows us to predict the demand for
a delegation option over ages and measure the welfare gains of available advisory services.

The

calibrated model predicts that the delegation option can bring 19.5% welfare gains in terms of
certainty equivalent consumption stream. This paper is also the rst investigation of the impact of
a time cost on investors' portfolio choice in the context of endogenous human capital accumulation
in a lifecycle setting.
In what follows, section 2 describes the specication of investors' problem of portfolio choice.
The model rst denes a management scheme of portfolio inertia and shows a suciency condition
for investors to choose portfolio inertia.

Next I introduce the option of hiring nancial advisors.

Section 4 presents a numerical solution of the model. I conclude with a discussion of the implications
of this paper's ndings for the nancial advisory industry, retirement plan sponsors and policy
makers for retirement pension plans.

2 Specication of Dynamic Portfolio Choice Model
The model incorporates a dynamic choice of the equity share of the portfolio, labor supply and
human capital accumulation, which inuence an employee's current and future labor income and
nancial wealth.

2.1 Assumption on Time Budget and the Ineciency Pattern of Financial Decision Making over Lifecycle
I assume that an investor is endowed with a normalized amount of time of 1 at each period and
that he can allocate this time to working(lt ) or consuming leisure(Lt ). The time can be interpreted
as a physical time of 24 hours or the mental capacity that we allocate to various activities in daily
life.
Managing nancial assets encompasses various activities from opening a brokerage account

3

(but not limited) to analyzing various nancial products. When the main task of an investor's job
is not involved in nancial work, which is the case for most DC retirement plan participants, selfmanagement of nancial asset will inevitably eat into a worker's time or mental resources, because
searching and processing information is costly to them. Because workers are compensated according
to their job-specic skills (or human capital) and because these job-specic skills are accumulated
mostly through work experience, they will incur an opportunity cost as a result of the time spent

1.

managing their nancial assets.

In this model, the explicit opportunity cost for adjusting one's portfolio is captured by the
time eciency

(φt ) of nancial decision making.

I assume an investor is not well informed regarding

the task of nancial management, so he should allocate some portion of his available time to acquire

2

and process various information related to portfolio management . Therefore, an investor faces the
time constraint as follows

lt + Lt + φt 1{at =1} = 1
where

at = 1

is an indicator for active portfolio management.

This time constraint condition

implies that an investor should incur a time cost when making his own choices to implement an

3

optimal portfolio . Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009) documented younger and older people are
likely to make more mistakes when it comes to nancial decisions. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) also
documented the time cost of the consumer's choice regarding various non-nancial products. This
empirical evidence shows that making an ecient nancial decision depends on age and that middleaged people tend to make fewer mistakes in controlling their wealth levels. I have implemented this
age-related eciency pattern of nancial decision making as the amount of time they need for
their nancial decisions; a low

φt

implies that the investor can do so eciently, and thus quickly

implement his new portfolio choice. I have adopted the empirical evidence of an age-related pattern
of ecient nancial decision making with a U-shaped

1

φt

over the lifecycle in this model. Note that

There might be a group of people that enjoys self-nancial management or even believes that they have a good

skill to outperform the market or professional investors. However, the proportion of these people is observed to be
very low among investors according to the literature of retirement pension management. Moreover, their performance
generally has not been superior to that of the market [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Mitchell et al. (2009)].

2

Tasks related to the portfolio management may include (but are not limited to) opening accounts, tracking past

market condition, monitoring market, nding the optimal portfolio level and executing the order of transaction.

3

After investors decide how to allocate their wealth between risk-free and risky assets, they also have to spend

time to implement their new choices.

For example, if they are implementing their choices by purchasing mutual

funds, they have to read and compare many mutual fund companies' prospectuses and execute trading orders.

If

they cannot nd a single mutual fund that implements their choice, they need to form a portfolio of various mutual
funds to achieve their desired level of equity share.

4
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this time cost does not depend on the amount of the adjusted portfolio share .

In this model,

investors should incur a new time cost(φt ) in each period, because they should solve their lifecycle
model and implement the new choice again.

2.2 Assumption on Human Capital Accumulation Process
I assume job-specic human capital is accumulated through learning by doing [Arrow (1962)]. I
denote

Ht

and lt as the job-specic human capital and working time, respectively, at time

t.

The

law of motion of job specic human capital is

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
where

Ft (·, ·)

is an experience formulation function and

δt

is a depreciation rate

5 of job specic

human capital.
An important feature of this formulation is the dynamic property of labor supply.

The

current working time(lt ) not only increases current labor income, but also can increase the stock of

6

future human capital, which will lead to higher labor income in the future . Much previous research
involving the labor supply model, including Bodie et al. (1992) and Cocco et al. (2005), incorporated
wage income as an important source of wealth, but the working decision only aected the current
income level. Thus, they implicitly assumed that working time is a substitute for current leisure
time and that the price of leisure was the current hourly wage.

In this paper's model, however,

the investor should consider future human capital accumulation, an age-related eciency pattern
of nancial decision making and the current level of leisure, when he decides how much time to
allocate to working.

2.3 Assumption on Labor Income and Asset Return
I assume labor income is determined by an employee's job-specic human capital level(Ht ) and wage
shock(Yt ).

labor incomet

4

= lt Ht Yt

This ineciency cost comes technically from the complexity that a normal worker faces when implementing his

choice from the dynamic programming problem [see e.g. Johnson et al. (1987)].

5

This can also be interpreted as `obsolete rate' of skills. Some set of knowledge can be outdated by the advent of

new technology.

6

This can be also interpreted as a reputation eect in a job market. With higher level of human capital accumulated

by more working time in the current period, the worker will be rewarded higher by the labor market or the current
rm in the next and future periods.

5

lt

where

represents working hours.

The accumulated human capital

Ht

is comparable with the

age-specic, deterministic wage trend in the lifecycle model literature [see e.g., Cocco et al. (2005),
Gomes et al. (2008)].

In this model, however,

Ht

is endogenously accumulated over time by a

worker's labor supply as in section 2.2.
The wage shock

(yt ≡ log Yt )

follows an AR(1) process and is inuenced by an idiosyncratic

shock(t ).

yt = η + ρyt−1 + yt
yt ∼ iid N (0, σy ).

where

I consider two asset classes:a stock and a risk-less bond. The stock return(Rt ) is assumed to
be i.i.d log normally distributed

7 over the years.

log Rt ∼ iid N (ζ, σζ )
The stock return shock and wage shock can be correlated:

covt (yt, log Rt ) = σζ
The riskless bond has return

R

at all periods. I do not consider the ination rate. Thus, the model

captures the ination-adjusted phenomenon of a portfolio decision problem. I denote
stock return from

t

to

t + 1,

so the decision time horizon is that

the return is realized at period

πt+1

Rt+1

as the

is determined at period

t

and

t + 1.

2.4 Assumptions on Portfolio Choice and Wealth Dynamics
At time

t,

the investor chooses the equity portion

(πt+1 )

in his portfolio and the portfolio will have

return

p
Rt+1
= (1 − πt+1 ) R + πt+1 Rt+1

Note that

7

p
Rt+1

is a random variable at time

t

and is realized at time

t + 1.

Tang et al. (2010) showed individuals generally have lower returns from managing their own portfolio.

For

simplicity, this paper assumes equity returns are the same for every portfolio management schemes (inertia portfolio,
active management and delegation).

6

Denoting

ct

as consumption, the dynamic budget constraint can be formulated as

p
Wt+1 = Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

Total cash-in-hand in period
After consuming

ct

in period

t (Wt+1 )
t,

8

(1)

consists of nancial wealth(Wt ) and labor income(lt Ht Yt ).

it is invested with return

p
Rt+1
.

2.5 Assumptions on Preferences and Time Horizon
In the manner of Gomes et al. (2008), an investor has a standard time-separable, modied CobbDouglas power utility function over consumption(ct ) and leisure(Lt ) given by

U (ct , Lt ) =
where

1
(ct (Lt )α )1−γ
1−γ

α captures an investor's preference over consuming leisure.

I only consider a portfolio adjust-

ment decision during working periods and there is no decision problem after the retirement time

(T ).

The retirement time is exogenously xed(T ).

9.

3 Dynamic Portfolio Choice Problem with Portfolio Inertia and the Role of
Financial Advisors
One important feature of individual portfolio management is the low turnover ratio or portfolio
inertia [see e.g., Bilias et al. (2009); Mitchell et al. (2006)].

3.1 Portfolio Inertia
The model in this paper denes inactivity or inertia in portfolio management with respect to the
opportunity cost of the portfolio adjustment and the time eciency of nancial decision making.

Denition 1. Portfolio inertia
portfolio

(πt )

at period

for next period's portfolio

t

is dened as a naive choice of the previous period's

(πt+1 )

By simply choosing his previous portfolio

without incurring time cost(φt ).

(πt ) as the next period's portfolio (πt+1 ), the investor

does not have to sacrice any portion(φt ) of his available time to solve his optimization problem

8

We can also introduce a direct transaction cost(C (πt, πt+1 )) for portfolio adjustment. Then the wealth dynamics

p
Wt+1 = Rt+1
Wt + lt Ht Yt − C (πt , πt+1 ) 1{adjustment} − ct when the direct transaction cost is incorporated.
However, I do not focus on direct monetary costs in this model. See Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) for estimating the
will be

direct monetary cost of portfolio adjustment.

9

See Smetters and Chen (2009) for a discussion about the role of social security in explaining the low level of

portfolio share among young workers.
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and implement its solution. Therefore, if the investor behaves with portfolio inertia, his next period
portfolio(πt+1 ) share does not change from the previous level(πt ) and his time constraint is not
impacted by the eciency pattern(φt ) of nancial decision making. Thus, when an investor chooses
portfolio inertia, he has the equity share and time constraint as follows

πt+1 = πt
lt + Lt = 1
Recall that lt and

Lt

denote working time and leisure respectively.

Note that the same portfolio choice over the subsequent periods does not constitute portfolio
inertia.

It is possible for an investor to choose to actively manage his portfolio by incurring the

time cost

(φt )

and end up choosing the previous portfolio(πt ) as the optimum for the next period's

portfolio(πt+1 ). In this case, the portfolio choice is not naive and the investor has to sacrice some

(φt )

portion

of his available time.

Since portfolio inertia allows that the previous portfolio choice can aect the current period's
decision regarding a portfolio management scheme, the previous portfolio also serves as a state

10 . Other state variables include wealth level(W ), accumulated human capital level(H )
t
t

variable

and current wage shock(yt ).

In total, we have 4 choice variables: portfolio management scheme

(i.e., portfolio inertia or active management), labor supply(lt ), the next period's equity share

(πt+1 )

and consumption(ct ).
An investor should solve a sequential problem as follows:

"
max

{ct ,lt ,πt+1 ,(at )}T
t=0

E

T
X

#
t

β ut (ct , Lt )

t=0

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
Wt+1 = Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt + φt 1{at =1} = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
where

10

{at }

is a decision set in which

at = 1

indicates a portfolio adjustment and

at = 0

indicates

Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) also investigates the cost of portfolio adjustment and used the previous portfolio

as one of state variables.

8

portfolio inertia.
In the manner of Adda and Cooper (2000), I dene

Vta (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) as the discounted lifetime

utility of an investor when he chooses an `active management' scheme. Similarly,

Vti (Wt, Ht , πt , yt )

denotes the discounted lifetime utility of an investor when he chooses a `portfolio inertia' scheme. I
dene the value function at period


t as Vt (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) ≡ max Vta (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) , Vti (Wt, Ht , πt , yt )

The value function for each portfolio management scheme is dened as

Vta (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) =

max

{ct ,πt+1 ,lt }

ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]

s.t. ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
Wt+1 = Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt + φt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
and the value function for choosing portfolio inertia is dened as

Vti (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) = max ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 = πt , yt+1 )]
{ct ,lt }

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )
Wt+1 = Rt+1

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
When

Vta ≥ Vti , the investor chooses an active management scheme (at = 1).

Otherwise, he chooses

portfolio inertia. The dierence between the two value functions are the time constraint and the
next period's portfolio choice. The benet of portfolio inertia is the saved time but the previous
portfolio may not be the optimal choice for the current period, which maximizes the lifetime utility
even when considering time cost

φt .

Before investigating the role of nancial advisors in this setting, I will briey discuss sucient

9

.

conditions for an investor to choose portfolio inertia. Let



ˆla , π̂ a , ĉa
t
t+1 t

and



ˆli , π̂ i = πt , ĉi
t t+1
t

be

11 of the objective functions of an active management scheme and a portfolio inertia

maximizers
scheme.

Proposition 2. For any

a − π , there exists
with max ˆlta − ˆlti , ĉat − ĉit < π̂t+1
t
< δ ∗ implies Vti (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) > Vta (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ).



ˆla , π̂ a , ĉa
t
t+1 t

δ∗ > 0

a
such that ∀π̂t+1
with

Proof.

See the Appendix.

a −π
π̂t+1
t

n

The implication of this proposition is simple and intuitive.

o

When next period's labor and

consumption levels chosen by an active portfolio management scheme are very close to those chosen
by a portfolio inertia scheme, there is a `dominating boundary of portfolio inertia' where the portfolio
inertia is superior to the active management scheme. In other words, when an investor expects that
he would end up choosing a similar pair of consumption level and labor supply in the next period,
a small change in the portfolio will only be costly without improving his discounted lifetime utility.
So it is optimal for him not to ddle around with portfolio management.

3.2 The Role of Financial Advisors
The current model enables us to explore the role of nancial advisors

12 in portfolio management

and to conduct counterfactual experiments about their contributions to investors' portfolio choices.
Reasons for delegating portfolio management may include time cost, the eciency gain due to lower
transaction costs and positive beliefs regarding professional managers' skills. In this paper, I focus
on investors' time costs associated with human capital accumulation.
When an investor chooses to delegate a portfolio management task, he pays some portion
of the total nancial wealth

(Wt ) to a nancial advisor as a management fee.

(ϕt )

The explicit benet of

hiring nancial advisors is the saved time, which can then be used to work (and accumulate more
job-specic knowledge) or enjoy leisure. If he chooses to manage his nancial portfolio by himself,
he does not have to pay this fee

(ϕt ),

but should incur a time cost

(φt ),

which is associated with

his age-based eciency pattern of nancial decision making. In this paper, I consider a nancial
advisor, who is very involved in an investor's decision making in the sense that she not only chooses
a portfolio, but also proposes an optimal consumption level and labor supply.

11
12

The existence of these solutions is discussed in the following chapter.
In U.S nancial markets, RIAs (Registered Investment Advisors) are registered with the Securities and Exchange

Commission and give advice on investing in various nancial products such as stocks, bond, mutual funds, etc. They
also manage portfolios of securities for their household or rm clients. This role can be technically interpreted as
helping to implement the optimal portfolio choice of investors.
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One important issue in delegating portfolio management is the possible conict of interest
between an investor (principal) and a nancial advisor (agent). Because an investor maximizes his
own utility over consumption and leisure, which are aorded by accumulated wealth, his optimal
portfolio decision may be dierent from that of a nancial advisor who maximizes only her total
revenue from managing clients' wealth.
If an investor observes the choice of an advisor (rst-best case), he can make sure his rstbest outcome is achieved. Denote
for

t = 1, . . . , T

cFt B (Wt , Ht , πt , yt )

,

F B (W , H , π , y )
πt+1
t
t t t

FB

and lt

(Wt , Ht , πt , yt )

as the rst-best policy of consumption, portfolio and labor supply for the investor.

It is a solution of the following dynamic optimization problem

Vt (Wt , Ht , πt , yt )
=

max

{ct ,πt+1 ,lt }

ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
Wt+1 = (1 − ϕt ) Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )
p
Rt+1
= (1 − πt+1 ) R + πt+1 Rt+1

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
Note that the employee does not have to incur a time cost

φt

and pays a management fee

ϕt

out of

his wealth.
However, an investor does not usually directly observe the nancial advisor's choice at the beginning of time t. The advisor will choose



p
{ct , πt+1 , lt } to maximize ϕt−1 Wt +βEt ϕt Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

given the above constraints. Since the nancial advisor's objective function is dierent from that
of an investor, the chosen policy function can be dierent from the rst-best solution. Then the
investor may incur additional costs to monitor the nancial advisor's behavior.
In a dynamic setting, however, this information cost from a moral hazard problem can be
mitigated because the nancial advisor should also consider future revenue (or reputation), which
will depend on the current period's outcome.

One important condition for the investor to im-

plement his rst-best choice is the veriability of the nancial advisor's choice.

This is possible

in our model setting when we assume the return process is easily observed by the investor or

11

other competing nancial advisors.

Since the return process

Rt

13 , he

is revealed to the investor

can easily discover the portfolio choice of the nancial advisor in the previous period. More formally, with the knowledge of wealth level
consumption-labor choice
from

{ct , lt },

Wt+1 ,

fee level

ϕt ,

bond return

which are all known at period

t + 1,

R,

wage shock

yt

and

the investor can calculate

πt

p
Wt+1 = (1 − ϕt ) Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct ).
Now, consider a contract that species the following

1. If



D D
cFt B , πtF B , ltF B = cD
t , πt , lt

for

t = 1, . . . , T − 1,

the investor pays a pre-determined fee



D D
cFt B , πtF B , ltF B =
6
cD
t , πt , lt

for

t = 1, . . . , T − 1,

the investor res the current nancial

ϕt .
2. If

advisor and hires another advisor. The original nancial advisor has no outside option in the
next period by assumption.

3. This contract is eective at every period.

In short, an investor can punish a nancial advisor by ring her (and replacing her with another
advisor) when he learns that the rst-best has not been chosen at the beginning of period t. Because
the outside option for a nancial advisor is zero by assumption, cheating will never be superior for
a nancial advisor to choosing an investor's rst-best choice. Thus, this contract will ensure that
the nancial advisor chooses the rst-best.
This contract enables us to solve only one (i.e., the investor's) dynamic programming problem
instead of two (the investor's and the nancial advisor's). An investor's maximization problem will
be implemented by a nancial advisor.

14

Therefore, the investor's problem can be summarized as

13

ϕt

We can also assume competitive market of nancial advisors.

when he is hired as a nancial advisor by an investor.

This implies every advisors are paid same fee

I also assume this fee includes next-period monitoring

t,
t = 1, . . . , T .
end of period T

cost . Even though the investor does not observe the nancial advisor's portfolio choice at the beginning of time
she can easily obtain information about past return process and total wealth level at the end of time
Competitive market assumption implies the nancial advisor is monitored by his competitors at the

and mischievous act will be publicized by them, which will damage his reputation and lower the possibility of being
hired by another investor. Therefore, the nancial advisor will choose the rst-best outcome of an investor's problem
and the investor dose not have to consider the incentive compatibility condition of the nancial advisor.

14

See Ou-Yang (2003) for continuous-time dynamic optimization problem in a delegated portfolio management

problem. He argues that a nancial advisor will exactly follow an investor's optimal portfolio policy if a symmetric
(i.e., reward and punishment) remuneration scheme is oered.
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Vt (Wt , Ht , πt , yt )
=

max

{at ,lt ,πt+1 ,ct }

ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
 p
Wt+1 = 1 − 1{at =2} ϕt Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )
p
Rt+1
= (1 − πt+1 ) R + πt+1 Rt+1

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt + φt 1{at =1} = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
πt+1 = πt
where I denote

at = 0

nancial advisor. And
case,

Vta

at = 0

if

as portfolio inertia,

Vt ≡ Vti , Vta , Vtd


at = 1

where

as active management and

Vti

at = 2

as hiring a

is the value function for the portfolio inertia

is the value function for active management, and

Vtd

is the value function for delegating

portfolio management.
An important specication in this model is the job-specic human capital accumulation function

Ft (Ht, , ht ).

I will specify this function [see Ben-Porath (1967)] as follows

Ft (Ht , lt ) = a (Ht lt )θ , (θ < 1)
where

a is a parameter that represents the individual eciency or the learning ability for accumulat-

ing human capital
returns to scale

15 . The elasticity

θ

of human capital accumulation is assumed to have decreasing

(θ ∈ (0, 1)).

4 Model solution
4.1 Existence of the Solution
Since an investor is not sure about the future chosen portfolio adjustment scheme, there is no
simple Euler equation that links the marginal benet of today's portfolio adjustment with the

15

Note that I am not using exactly the same notion of human capital as Ben-Porath (1967). He interpreted human

capital as something to be accumulated only by getting more education at school.

In this model, human capital

represents job-specic skill, knowledge or reputation in a current workplace which is accumulated by working, not
education at school.
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future marginal benet [Adda and Cooper (2003)].

However, the existence of a solution can be

shown by the Backward Induction and the Weierstrass Theorem.

Proposition 3. There exist optimal sets of policies

portfolio choice problem.
Proof.

{at , ct , πt+1 , lt }Tt=1

for an investor's dynamic

See the appendix.

The existence of solutions is guaranteed, but deriving them is analytically intractable. Therefore, this model will be solved numerically via backward induction, polynomial approximation of
the value function, Monte-Carlo integration and the Nelder-Mead simplex method.

4.2 Numerical Solution and Baseline Parameters
I will briey describe the procedure for obtaining the numerical solution to the investor's prob-

16 . In the last period

lem

over

cT

and

lT

assuming

VT +1 = 0

at every pair of state variables

max{cT ,lT } u (cT , 1 − lT ).
Then, I approximate
state variable

T,

V̂T

aT = 0,

the investor maximizes her utility

(WT , HT , πT , yT ).

Thus,

VT (WT , HT , πT , yT ) =

This maximization problem is solved by the Nelder-Mead simplex method.
by the polynomial regression of the maximized value

(WT , HT , πT , yT ).

In period

tion with the Monte Carlo integration of
timization method over

and

(lT −1 , πT , cT ).

VT

over the pairs of

T − 1, I calculate VTi −1 , VTa−1 , VTd−1 by their denih
i
ET −1 V̂T (WT , HT , πT , yT ) and the Nelder-Mead op-

Of course,

πT = πT −1

in calculating

VTi −1 .

Then, I get

VT −1 (WT −1 , HT −1 , πT −1 , yT −1 ) = max VTi −1 , VTa−1 , VTd−1 and we know portfolio inertia is opti i
i
a
d
mal when VT −1 = max VT −1 , VT −1 , VT −1 . Another choice of management scheme is similarly


derived.

Then I approximate

V̂T −1

by the polynomial regression of

VT −1

over the pair of state

variables(WT −1 , HT −1 , πT −1 , yT −1 ). Iterating these steps until the rst period, I get the approximated value functions

n oT
V̂t

t=1

and this characterizes the solution of the investor's problem com-

pletely. Then I generate 1,000 sample paths of individual investors with the variations of the wage

17 .

shock and the stock market return shock

In order to describe the model's characterization of the portfolio inertia and its prediction
of the impact of a nancial advisory service, we need to choose a reasonable set of parameters. I
set the coecient of risk aversion
(2008). The discounting factor

16

β

γ

to 2.5 and the leisure preference

α

to 0.9 as in Gomes et al.

is set to 0.95. I set the elasticity parameter

θ

in the experience

This numerical procedure is implemented with FORTRAN90 with the GNU Gfortran compiler in the Wharton

Grid system and it took approximately 20 hours.

17

Variation in the stock market return implies that individual investors hold dierent sets of equity, so they may

face dierent stock returns but the return distributions are still the same (IID log normal).
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accumulation function to 0.209 and the accumulation rate
Additionally, human capital

Ht

a is set to 0.7 as in Huggett et al. (2006).

depreciates with rate of 1.4% per annum as in Huggett et al. (2006).

For the AR(1) process for the wage shock, the drift parameter

η

is set to 0.08 and the

autocorrelation coecient is set to 0.85 with a wage shock standard deviation of 0.1389.
riskless asset return

R

The

is set to 1.02 [Cocco et al. (2005)] and the risk premium is 4% with a

standard deviation of 0.205 [Gomes et al. (2008)]. The portfolio management fee

ϕt

is set to 1.3%,

which is the average management fee for U.S portfolio allocation mutual funds [MorningStar 2009]

18 .
The eciency pattern of nancial decision making is assumed to be of convex form, as supported by evidence presented in Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009). The age group with 30 working
years is assumed to be the most nancially savvy, with

φ22 = 0.03 (they are assumed to sacrice only

3% of their normalized time). Young investors are assumed to have the lowest eciency
The functional form of decision eciency is assumed to be

φt =

0.09−0.03
304

φ1 = 0.0919 .

(age − 30)4 + 0.03,

where

the 4th power represents a atter eciency pattern in middle-aged. This set of baseline parameters
is summarized in Table 1.

4.3 Solution and its Implication
Figures 1 and 2 plot the average proportions of the chosen portfolio management schemes in dierent
scenarios; one without a delegation option and one with a delegation option. Figure 1 shows that,
consistent with the empirical evidence, portfolio inertia is the main portfolio management scheme
implemented by most investors.

Most younger workers choose portfolio inertia rather than to

actively self-manage their asset allocations.

Middle-aged workers are the most active group, but

almost 40% of them still nd it optimal to not touch their portfolio allocation. This high level of
inactivity is consistent with several examples from the empirical literature [Mitchell et al. (2006);
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)]. Portfolio inertia in a young working group reects their concern about
human capital accumulation, which will be a source of their labor income in future periods. Because
they have the longest horizon of human capital usage among working groups, it is optimal for them
to not sacrice their time by ddling around with their nancial portfolios, which is not in their
professional area. The middle-aged group has the lowest deciency in nancial decision making, and

18

Even though the role of a nancial advisor is somewhat dierent from that of a mutual fund, it is known that

their fee levels are similar (c.f., Investopia.com).
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This choice does not depend on any empirical evidence, so it needs to be estimated by this model with any

relevant data. A time cost of 9% is quite high, but this will make it apparent how eciency patterns will aect the
portfolio management scheme.
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their human capital is abundant compared to their younger counterparts. Thus, sacricing a small
amount of time will not necessarily hurt their life-time value much, even when their labor income is
not very high. Inactivity in the older working group can similarly be explained by their deciency in
nancial decision making. These people face low eciency in their nancial decision making, which
means they have to sacrice a larger fraction of their time to self-manage their portfolio. Thus, it
will be costlier for them to self-manage their portfolio than it will be for the middle-aged group.
However, they are still more active than young investors, because the decreasing returns to scale
property of human capital accumulation makes it less costly to adjust their portfolio in terms of
future labor income.
Figure 2 shows the proportions of the chosen management schemes when there is an option
to hire nancial advisor.

First, we observe a decrease in portfolio inertia across all age groups.

Approximately 85% of young workers, 20% of middle-aged workers and 7% of old workers choose
portfolio inertia as their management scheme. Second, delegating portfolio management becomes
the dominant portfolio management scheme across all age groups, replacing the importance of the
active management scheme in the previous case.

Approximately 15% of young workers, 60% of

middle-aged workers and 90% of old workers want to delegate their portfolio management task to
nancial advisors.

Third, the active management scheme is implemented mostly by middle-aged

workers with working experience between 23 to 41 years (i.e., workers age 34 to 62, if we assume
people enter the labor market at 21 years old).

Only a small fraction (less than 1%) of young

workers and 5% of old workers choose active self-management. About 15% of middle-aged workers
choose active self-management as their nancial management scheme.

These observations show

that introducing a portfolio delegation option has a substantial impact on all age groups, especially
younger and older investors. The model incorporates a delegation option along with portfolio inertia
and active management, so if the new option does not provide any benet to investors, their choice
should not be dierent from the previous one. But as the new solutions shows, the middle-aged and
older groups chose the delegation option as their main management scheme.
The pattern of portfolio management scheme selection reects the pattern of decision-making
deciency and human capital accumulation.

For younger investors, their shallow pool of human

capital makes it too costly for them to spend their time managing their nancial assets, which does
not explicitly increase their human capital or job-specic knowledge. When there is no delegation
option, their best strategy was to choose `no-touch' so that they could fully make use of their
available time to work and accumulate job-specic skills. But when the delegation option is available,
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many of them nd it optimal to pay the management fee and delegate their portfolio management
rather than self-manage their money.

If some of them expect their current portfolios to be near

optimal in the next period, they will still choose portfolio inertia without paying a fee to a nancial
advisor or sacricing their time (see Proposition 2). Older investors also nd it helpful to have a
nancial advisor. With more accumulated nancial wealth, their need to have someone to manage
their assets becomes very high. Because they undergo a high level of deciency when making their
nancial decisions, they would choose to pay a management fee and they do not sacrice their time.
They nd it more protable to fully make use of their time to work or enjoy leisure. It is noteworthy
that the middle-aged working group remains the most active nancial decision makers. They are
actively participating in their portfolio reallocation by either choosing active management or hiring
nancial advisors. Since this group is more active in self-management, they may have more demand
for a brokerage service than other age groups.
Figure 3 plots the portfolio choice in each scenario over the lifecycle. One noticeable nding
is that people without a delegation option are likely to hold a lower fraction of the risky asset in
comparison with those with a delegation option in their early career stages. Since the delegation
option saves investors' time, they can fully make use of their time to work and accumulate more
human capital, which is safer than equity.

Therefore, they have more of a buer to the poten-

tially negative shock of equity returns and they can invest more in risky asset. With our baseline
parameters, middle-aged people invest most of their wealth in equity.
Figure 4 plots the consumption level over the lifecycle in the two scenarios.

We nd that

investors with a delegation option can consume more than those without a delegation option. There
is little dierence in the two scenarios (i.e., with and without a delegation option) in the early
working periods, but the delegation service brings more consumption in the middle and later years.
When delegating nancial management is available, workers can allocate more time to their work and
accumulate more job-specic knowledge, which leads to higher income and consumption.
5 plots the average wealth of investors.
higher level of wealth eventually.

Figure

We observe that nancial advisory service can bring a

This is not because they bring much higher excess return in

nancial management but they save time and the deciency cost which is associated with portfolio
management in this model.
delegation option.

These two gures suggest that there is a benet introduced by a

Investors can consume more and accumulate more wealth when a delegation

option is available because they can fully make use of their time to accumulate their job-specic
skills. In this model, a small management fee (1.13%) is a worthwhile cost for investors, who are
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responsible for managing their nancial assets, but are not usually very well informed about the
task.
Figure 6 plots the fraction of investors' available time allocated to their own work.

It has

an inverse U-shape over the lifecycle, which is consistent with the macroeconomics literature.

If

a nancial advisory service is not available, the worker must sacrice some portion of his time,
which could have been allocated to working, to self-manage his asset.

In the early career stage,

the delegation option enables workers to allocate more time to working and accumulating more
human capital. In the later career stages, the option enables the worker to work less (and therefore
enjoy more leisure), but continue to accumulate human capital by sparing time spent on nancial
management. Saved time can be allocated to leisure too, which will lead to higher life-time utility.
Figure 7 plots the pattern of accumulated human capital over the lifecycle.

We nd that

investors with a delegation option can accumulate more human capital than those without a delegation option. With the delegation option available, workers can fully make use of their time to
work without ddling around with their nancial wealth and thus enjoy more leisure with the same
level of human capital accumulation compared to that of a self-management case.
The welfare gain is measured in terms of certainty equivalent (CE) constant consumption
stream, which is standard in the related literature. It is dened as the stream of consumption that
would provide the same level of expected lifetime utility as the uncertain consumption and leisure

20 .

the investor expects

Figure 8 plots the pattern of welfare gains over age when utilizing a nancial advisory service
for dierent levels of relative risk aversion. With the baseline parameters, we get a 19.5% increased
level of annual consumption stream when the delegation option is available to young investors. This
implies that investors can enjoy a 19.5% higher annual consumption stream when they have the

20

(cCE )
#

In the manner of Chai et al. (2009), the certainty equivalent(CE) consumption

"
Vt (W1 , H1 , π1 , y1 ) =E

T
X

βi

i=t−1

=

T
X

βi

i=t−1

where

L∗

is a xed level of leisure and

(W1 , H1 , π1 , y1 )

1
(ci (Li )α )1−γ
1−γ

is dened as

1−γ
1
ctCE (L∗ )α
1−γ

is the initial pair of state. With some algebraic manipulation,

we get

"

(1 − γ) Vt
α 1−γ i
β
i=t−1 (L∗ )

#1−γ

ctCE = PT
In calculating this measure, I set leisure amount

L∗

as time deducted by mean labor hours up to working year 40

because labor supply decreases signicantly after that time.
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option to hire nancial advisors to manage their nancial portfolios. This quantity is substantial
compared to that of Cocco et al. (2005), which measured the welfare gains of exible portfolio
allocation at around 2% compared to the xed equity share investment heuristic.
It also shows that the magnitude of welfare gain over age is U-shaped. Young and old workers
are most beneted by the delegation option. Welfare gains get higher when the relative risk aversion
gets higher. When investors have high risk aversion, the time sacriced to accumulate more human
capital will be even costlier, because their safe asset (labor income) decreases. Therefore, the option
to delegate the task of nancial management will be more benecial to them compared to those
with lower risk aversion.
It is noteworthy that the welfare gains introduced by a delegation option in this model are
smaller than the true enhancement. This measure does not take into account the possible additional
benets that nancial advisors can bring about, such as low transaction costs by economies of scale
and (possible) excess returns.

4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, I check the robustness of the result by varying key parameters and investigate
the role that the parameters play in the model's predictions.
Figure 10 plots the choice of portfolio management scheme with dierent levels of risk-aversion.
People are likely to choose portfolio inertia more as risk-aversion increases. When a delegation option
is available, it dominates the other two management schemes for most age groups. However, more
people are likely to self-manage their portfolios when risk aversion decreases. This increased level
of active management can be explained by the human capital accumulation process in this model.
When an investor is more risk-tolerant, the cost of active management is less costly because they
have more appetite for a risky asset, thus the sacriced time to accumulate human capital, which
leads to higher labor income (a safer asset than equity) becomes less costly.
Figure 11 plots the welfare gain with use of a nancial advisory service for dierent levels
of nancial decision making eciency.

This gure implies that the welfare gain is higher when

investors' nancial management eciency is low. Since nancial advisors help to save investors' time
associated with nancial management ineciency, people with low levels of nancial management
skill will be beneted more than those with high levels of skill. This result suggests that governments
should devise a policy to make nancial advisory services accessible to investors' with low nancial
literacy, especially younger and older investors.
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5 Conclusion
This study develops a lifecycle model to solve an optimal portfolio management scheme of nitelylived investors who face portfolio management costs and the age-dependent ineciency of nancial
decision making. Since investors accumulate job-specic knowledge by working, portfolio adjustment
costs can have dierent impacts on dierent age groups. Based on a reasonable set of parameters,
the model replicates portfolio inertia over all age groups, especially for young and old investors. This
is because investors in their early career stages have a higher rate of human capital accumulation
and thus spending time in nancial management, which is not closely relevant to their job-specic
skills, is very costly. Middle-aged investors are the most active group in terms of managing their
own portfolios but almost 50% of them choose to remain inactive.

A decreased eciency level

of nancial decision making induced a signicant portion of old investors to also choose portfolio
inertia.
The model enables us to perform counterfactual experiments about the choice of portfolio
management scheme when the option of delegating portfolio management to nancial advisors is
available. Under the baseline parameters, the delegation option replaces portfolio inertia across all
age groups. About 30% of young investors switch from portfolio inertia to portfolio management
delegation. Approximately 70% of middle-aged investors hire nancial advisors, but they still remain
as the most active self management group.

Approximately 80% of old investors delegate their

portfolio management to nancial advisors and less than 5% of them still manage their portfolios
themselves. In general, the model predicts that old investors will be the biggest customer group of
nancial advisors.
The welfare gains resulting from the introduction of a delegation option are substantial as
measured by the constant consumption stream of certainty equivalent (CE). With baseline parameters, the introduction of a delegation option will increase young investors' constant stream of
certainty equivalent (CE) consumption by 19.5%. This means investors can enjoy a higher level of
annual consumption across the lifecycle when the delegation option is available. The level of the
welfare gain is substantially higher than that of Cocco et al. (2005) who measured the welfare gains
of exible portfolio management compared to xed asset allocation.

The model also shows that

the magnitude of welfare gains over age is U-shaped. Young and old workers are most beneted by
the delegation option. Since this model only considers the welfare gains of investors, it ignores the
welfare gains for the nancial advisory industry. Thus, the actual welfare gains to the economy will
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be greater than the calculated level.
These ndings have relevant implications for retirement plan sponsors, the nancial advisory
industry and policy makers wishing to support diverse age groups in retirement plans.

As this

paper's model predicts, nancial advisory services will be very appealing to younger and older
investors, and the availability of such services will have a meaningful impact on these groups'
portfolio management.

In addition, the nancial advisors to middle-aged investors should also

consider the fact that some of them still want to remain active in managing their nancial assets,
even when a delegation option is available. These people may have demand for brokerage services
to self-manage their nancial wealth.
Policy makers should consider the potential positive welfare gains of improving investors'
access to prudential nancial advisory services.

Devising a policy to secure the duciary role of

nancial advisors will assist investors in managing their nancial wealth optimally.
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Solution
Parameter
Working periods

Baseline

Source

T

45

-

β

0.95

-

2.5

-

Time discounting
Risk aversion

γ

Leisure preference

α

Experience formulation
Elasticity of

Ht

a
θ

accumulation

Lowest ineciency of nancial decision

φlow

Highest ineciency of nancial decision

φhigh

Depreciation of Human Capital

δt

Eciency of nancial decision making
Wage shock drift

0.09−0.03
304

Risk free rate

Huggett et al. (2006)
-

per annum

0.08

Huggett et al. (2006)
-

0.85

-

σwage

0.1389

Gomes et al. (2008)

0.04

Gomes et al. (2008)

σstock

0.205

Gomes et al. (2008)

1.02

Cocco et al. (2005)

ρ

Risk premium
Std. of stock return

0.7
0.03

(age − 30)4 + 0.03

η

Wage shock auto correlation
Std. of Wage shock

Gomes et al. (2008)
Huggett et al. (2006)

0.09
1.4%

φt

0.9
0.209

R

Delegation annual fee

ϕt

1.3%

Correlation between wage and stock return
Initial wealth for simulation

σζ

W0

Initial human capital for simulation
Initial equity share for simulation
Initial wage shock for simulation

H0

π0
y0

24

per annum

MorningStar(2009)

0

Cocco et al. (2005)

0

-

10

90.48% of rst year wage

0

Ameriks and Zeldes (2000)

0.1

-

Figure 1: Portfolio Management Scheme Without Delegation Option

This gure shows the choice of portfolio management scheme when nancial advisory service is
NOT available. This gure replicates the empirical nding in the household nance literature that
severe inactivity in individual portfolio management is widespread.

When an investor does not

have a delegation option, young investors are likely to choose `no touch' strategy for their portfolio
management.

Since young workers have low levels of accumulated human capital but have long

horizon to use it, their foregone opportunity to accumulate human capital might be costlier than
the other ages groups with a high level of human capital accumulation. A fraction of old investors are
likely to choose to be inactive because they have to incur ineciency cost for making a sophisticated
nancial decision. Middle-aged people is more active in portfolio management compared to their
younger and older counterparts.
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Figure 2: Portfolio Management Scheme With Delegation Option

This gure shows the proportions of the chosen management schemes when there is an option
to hire nancial advisor.

First, we observe a decrease in portfolio inertia across all age groups.

Approximately 85% of young workers, 20% of middle-aged workers and 7% of old workers choose
portfolio inertia as their management scheme. Second, delegating portfolio management becomes
the dominant portfolio management scheme across all age groups, replacing the importance of the
active management scheme in the previous case.

Approximately 15% of young workers, 60% of

middle-aged workers and 90% of old workers want to delegate their portfolio management task to
nancial advisors.

Third, the active management scheme is implemented mostly by middle-aged

workers with working experience between 23 to 41 years (i.e., workers age 34 to 62, if we assume
people enter the labor market at 21 years old).

Only a small fraction (less than 1%) of young

workers and 5% of old workers choose active self-management. About 15% of middle-aged workers
choose active self-management as their nancial management scheme.

These observations show

that introducing a portfolio delegation option has a substantial impact on all age groups, especially
younger and older investors.
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Figure 3: Portfolio Choice over the Lifecycle

This gure plots the portfolio choice in each scenario over the lifecycle. One noticeable nding is that
people without a delegation option are likely to hold a lower fraction of the risky asset in comparison
with those with a delegation option in their early career stages. Since the delegation option saves
investors' time, they can fully make use of their time to work and accumulate more human capital,
which is safer than equity. Therefore, they have more of a buer to the potentially negative shock of
equity returns and they can invest more in risky asset. With our baseline parameters, middle-aged
people invest most of their wealth in equity.
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Figure 4: Consumption Level over the Lifecycle

This gure plots the consumption level over the lifecycle in the two scenarios. We nd that investors
with a delegation option can consume more than those without a delegation option. There is little
dierence in the two scenarios (i.e., with and without a delegation option) in the early working
periods, but the delegation service brings more consumption in the middle and later years. When
delegating nancial management is available, workers can allocate more time to their work and
accumulate more job-specic knowledge, which leads to higher income and consumption.
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Figure 5: Wealth Level over the Lifecycle

This gure plots the average wealth level of investors over the lifecycle. We observe that nancial
advisory service can bring a higher level of wealth eventually. This is not because they bring much
higher excess return in nancial management but they save time and the deciency cost which is
associated with portfolio management in this model. This is another evidence for the claim that
introducing delegation or advisory service will produce signicant welfare gain for investors.
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Figure 6: Working Time Chosen over the Lifecycle

This gure plots the fraction of investors' available time allocated to their own work. It has an inverse
U-shape over the lifecycle, which is consistent with the macroeconomics literature. If a nancial
advisory service is not available, the worker must sacrice some portion of his time, which could
have been allocated to working, to self-manage his asset. In the early career stage, the delegation
option enables workers to allocate more time to working and accumulating more human capital. In
the later career stages, the option enables the worker to work less (and therefore enjoy more leisure),
but continue to accumulate human capital by sparing time spent on nancial management. Saved
time can be allocated to leisure too, which will lead to higher life-time utility.

30

Figure 7: Human Capital Accumulation Pattern over the Lifecycle

This gure plots the pattern of accumulated human capital over the lifecycle. We nd that investors
with a delegation option can accumulate more human capital than those without a delegation
option.

With the delegation option available, workers can fully make use of their time to work

without ddling around with their nancial wealth and thus enjoy more leisure with the same level
of human capital accumulation compared to that of a self-management case.
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Figure 8: Welfare gains for Dierent Risk Aversion Parameters (ρ)

This gure plots the pattern of welfare gains over ages by a nancial advisory service for dierent
levels of relative risk aversion.
shaped.

It shows that the magnitude of welfare gains over ages are U-

Young and old workers are most beneted by the delegation option.

Welfare gains get

higher when the relative risk aversion gets higher. When investors have high risk aversion, the time
sacriced to accumulate more human capital will be even costlier, because their safe asset (labor
income) decreases. Therefore, the option to delegate the task of nancial management will be more
benecial to them compared to those with lower risk aversion.
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Figure 9: Welfare gains for Dierent Ineciency Parameters (φHigh )

This gure plots the welfare gain with use of a nancial advisory service for dierent levels of nancial
decision making eciency. This gure implies that the welfare gain is higher when investors' nancial
management eciency is low. Since nancial advisors help to save investors' time associated with
nancial management ineciency, people with low levels of nancial management skill will be
beneted more than those with high levels of skill. This result suggests that governments should
devise a policy to make nancial advisory services accessible to investors' with low nancial literacy,
especially younger and older investors.
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Figure 10: Patterns of Management Scheme with Dierent Risk Aversions

(ρ)

This gure plots the choice of portfolio management scheme with dierent levels of risk-aversion.
People are likely to choose portfolio inertia more as risk-aversion increases.

When a delegation

option is available, it dominates the other two management schemes for most age groups. However,
more people are likely to self-manage their portfolios when risk aversion decreases. This increased
level of active management can be explained by the human capital accumulation process in this
model. When an investor is more risk-tolerant, the cost of active management is less costly because
they have more appetite for a risky asset, thus the sacriced time to accumulate human capital,
which leads to higher labor income (a safer asset than equity) becomes less costly.
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Figure 11: Patterns of Management Scheme with Dierent Eciency Parameters

(φHigh )

This gure shows that the choice patterns of portfolio management schemes are similar for dierent
ineciency parameters

φHigh

on nancial decision making.

One interesting nding is that the

result is robust to the assumption on a shape of ineciency pattern over ages. The baseline case
assumes a U-shaped ineciency pattern of nancial decision making but the model with a at
ineciency pattern over ages also generate similar results to that of the baseline case. The portion
of portfolio inertia is lowest among middle-aged workers and highest among young workers. The
delegation option dominates the other two alternatives and small portion of middle-aged workers
are likely to self-manage their portfolio.

This robustness result shows that the choice pattern of

nancial management schemes over ages is not driven by the shape of ineciency pattern of nancial
decision making.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Dene the excess value of choosing inertia portfolio over active management scheme as

Ṽt (lt , πt+1 , ct ; Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) ≡Vti (Wt , Ht , πt , yt )
− {u (ct , 1 − lt − φt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]}
The latter part is the objective function of active portfolio management scheme. Then,the excess
value function is



i
Ṽt ˆlti , π̂t+1
, ĉit ; Wt , Ht , πt , yt




=u ĉit , 1 − ˆlti − u ĉit , 1 − φt − ˆlti
>0
Ṽt (·; Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) is continuous

i
in (lt , πt+1 , ct ), then ∃δ > 0 such that ∀ (lt , πt+1 , ct ) with d (lt , πt+1 , ct ) , ˆ
lti , πt , ĉit < δ , we have
q
o
n
Ṽt (lt , πt+1 , ct ; Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) > 0. Choose δ ∗ = 3δ . By the assumption that max ˆlta − ˆlti , ĉat − ĉit <
because utility function

u

is increasing in leisure time.

Since

h

a −π
π̂t+1
t

, the condition

a − π < δ∗
π̂t+1
t

ˆla − ˆli
t
t
Thus,
latter

2

implies that

a
+ π̂t+1
− πt

2

+ ĉat − ĉit

2

< 3 (δ ∗ )2 = δ


n 
o

a ,y
> 0 and the
Vti (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) − u ĉat , 1 − ˆlta − φt + βEt Vt+1 Wt+1 , Ht+1 , π̂t+1
t+1


a
ˆla , π̂ a , ĉa is the solution of active management
part is now Vt (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) because
t
t+1 t

scheme. So we showed

Vti > Vta

for all

a
π̂t+1

with

a − π < δ∗.
π̂t+1
t

QED

6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
I use backward induction to show the existence of a solution for an investor's portfolio choice problem
without delegation option. The existence of solution for delegation option can be similarly proved.
Using a discrete choice model, I can dene a value function as


Vt (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) = max Vta (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) , Vti (Wt, Ht , πt , yt )
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for all state vector

{(Wt, Ht , πt , yt )}Tt=1 .

The superscript

a

denotes the portfolio adjustment and

i

denotes inaction. The value functions for each decisions are dened as

Vta (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) =

max

{ct ,πt+1 ,lt }

ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
Wt+1 = Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt + φt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
and for the inactivity case

Vti (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) = max ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Ht+1 , πt+1 = πt , yt+1 )]
{ct ,lt }

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )
Wt+1 = Rt+1

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
Now, I can use a backward induction.

1. At the retirement period T, an investor does not make any portfolio decision(πT +1

= πT ) and

consumes all his wealth

cT = RTp (WT + lt∗ HT YT )
∗

where lt is determined by static optimal decision between lt and
Now,

VT (WT, HT , πT , yT )

Lt

with lt

for each state is well dened and we can nd

by their denitions.
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+ Lt = 1 (φt = 0).

VTa−1 (·)

and

VTi −1 (·)

2. With known

VTa−1 (·)

and

VTi −1 (·),

I can nd

VT −1 (·)

as


VT −1 (·) = max VTa−1 (·) , VTi −1 (·)
And we know there exist a solution for

VTa−1

and

VTi −1

because the constraint sets are compact

and objective function is continuous [The Weierstrass Theorem].

3. Repeat step 1 and 2 until the rst period.

4. After I nd value functions at every periods, I can derive policy functions, especially portfolio
adjustment decision at each period.

When delegation is available, an investor can fully utilize her time to work optimally. The value
function at each state vector is dened as

n
o
Vt (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) = max Vta (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) , Vti (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) , Vtd (Wt, Ht , πt , yt )
for all state vector

(Wt, Ht , πt , yt ).

manager. The value functions

The superscript

d

denotes delegating to a professional money

Vta (Wt, Ht , πt , yt ) , Vti (Wt, Ht , πt , yt )

are dened in the same way in

the previous section. With management fee(ϕt ), the value function with delegation option is dened
as

Vtd (Wt , Ht , πt , yt ) = max ut (ct , Lt ) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1 , yt+1 , πt+1 , yt+1 )]
ct ,πt+1 ,lt

s.t ct ≤ Wt + lt Ht Yt
p
Wt+1 = (1 − ϕt ) Rt+1
(Wt + lt Ht Yt − ct )

Ht+1 = (1 − δt ) Ht + Ft (Ht , lt )
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
Since

VT

is well dened as shown above,

−1
{Vt }Tt=1

problems have solutions.
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is well dened and we know the maximization

